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Rice v. Cayetano: The Supreme Court Declines to Extend Federal
1
Indian Law Principles to Native Hawaiians Sovereign Rights

Jeanette Wolfley

2

Good Evening. I am honored to be here with you and to
3
participate on this panel to discuss the decision in Rice v. Cayetano. I feel
privileged to share some thoughts with you about the decision as it relates
to Indian Country, and its impact on Indian tribes and individual Indians.
The grand scholar of federal Indian law, Felix S. Cohen, wrote in
1953 that, "like the miner's canary, the Indian marks the shift from fresh
air to poison gas in our political atmosphere; and our treatment of Indians,
even more than our treatment of other minorities, reflects the rise and fall
4
in our democratic faith .... " Felix Cohen's canary surely darkened many
shades during the 2000 term of the U.S. Supreme Court. The Rice
5
decision affecting Native Hawaiians and the Nevada v. Hicks decision
impacting Indian tribes reflect a continuing shift in the Court's
jurisprudence on Indian tribes' jurisdiction, and now Native Hawaiians
rights.
Over the past fifteen years, the Supreme Court has increasingly
become a forum to be avoided by Indian tribes. This fifteen-year period
has marked a shift in the Court's Indian law jurisprudence and coincides
with the rise of William Rehnquist as Chief Justice. Although the Court
under Chief Justice Warren Burger was not considered to be particularly
thoughtful of Indian interests, its record stands in sharp contrast to that of
the Rehnquist Court.
The record is revealing in terms of wins and loses. In the last ten
terms, Indian tribal interests have lost seventy-seven percent of all their
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cases before the Rehnquist Court; they lost only thirty-six percent of their
6
cases before the Burger Court. Tribal interests have not won a single case
before the Supreme Court involving state jurisdiction over non-Indians,
and they have lost seventy-three percent of the cases involving tribal
7
jurisdiction over nonmembers. It is difficult to find another class of cases
or type of litigant that has fared worse before the Supreme Court. Indeed,
even criminals seeking reversals of their convictions succeed thirty-six
percent of the time in the Rehnquist Court compared to tribes' twenty8
three percent success rate!
The recent Indian law decisions by the Court are radical departures
from the established principles of Indian law. The decisions reflect a
conviction of a majority of the Rehnquist Court that states' rights must be
protected, color-blind justice must be advanced, and mainstream values
9
must be promoted.
The Rehnquist Court in Indian law cases routinely ignores
precedent from prior courts. It rarely employs the traditional canons of
construction to give the benefit of doubt to Indians when interpreting
10
More devastating, though, the Supreme
ambiguous treaties or laws.
Court has refused to stay its hand and rely on the Congress to decide the
boundaries of Indian sovereignty and jurisdiction. In short, the Supreme
Court is mapping new Indian policy instead of leaving it to Congress.
Indeed, it is now Congress that is the protector of native interests against
11
the onslaught of the Supreme Court decisions.
6

David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court's Pursuit of
State's Rights, Color-Blind Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REV. 267, 28081 (2001).
7

Id.
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9

See generally Getches, supra note 6.
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See e.g., Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 421-22 (1994) (holding that Congress
had diminished the Ute Reservation and therefore Utah courts had jurisdiction over an
Indian defendant); South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 687 (1993) (holding that
certain federal statutes abrogated the treaty rights of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe to
regulate hunting and fishing by non-Indians on reservation lands acquired by a reservoir
project).
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For example, in 1990, Congress responded to the U.S. Supreme Court
decision in Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990), by means of a rider to a Defense
Appropriations Act amending the definition section of the Indian Civil Rights Act to
correct the Court's misreading of congressional intent, and thus to implicitly overturn
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Moreover, the Supreme Court no longer seems willing to view
Indian law cases as a distinct field of law with its own legal and policy
roots. It seems to have lost sight of the historical fact that Indian law cases
define the relationship of tribes in the United States - a matter rooted in
centuries old policy created as part of the nation's constitutional
12
framework.
There has been a two-fold response in Indian Country to the
Court's decisions. The first response of Indian tribes is to avoid Supreme
Court litigation. Certainly, it is not always possible to prevent the Court
from hearing an Indian case, but more and more tribal attorneys are
encouraging their clients to settle, or not to appeal certain appellate court
decisions. The second response has been to pursue Congressional
legislation. There is now a movement in Indian Country to propose
remedial legislation to overturn or limit the Court's recent decisions in
. 1aw. 13
In drnn
As I read and reread the Rice decision, I realized how similar it is
to the trend in the recent Indian law cases decided by the Supreme Court.
For example, Rice, in many respects, represents the discomfort the Justices
feel for upholding "special treatment" of Native Americans under the law.
The Court in Rice reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision allowing the State
of Hawaii to conduct a Natives-only election of trustees to administer a
trust to benefit Native Hawaiians. It found that the Fifteenth Amendment,
adopted after the Civil War to prevent states from denying the elective
franchise to former slaves, prevented Hawaii's attempt to address a
perceived history of injustice toward its Native peoples.
Particularly disturbing about the Rice decision is the cavalier
approach by the Court to the significant issues presented. In particular, the
Supreme Court demonstrated no awareness of the real circumstances of
Dura. Defense Appropriations Act of FY 91, Pub. L. No. 101-938, § 8077 (1990)
(amending 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (1983)).
12

Three key decisions of the early nineteenth century form the foundation of
federal Indian law. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation
v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831 ); Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543
(1823). The foundational concepts have constitutional roots relying upon the Commerce
Clause and the pre-constitutional relationship between Indian tribes and the United
States.
13
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Native Hawaiians.
The Court totally disregarded the significant
circumstances, the motives, and the historical backdrop that led to the nonN ative, majority-sanctioned special election of trustees for the benefit of
disadvantaged Native minority in the state. These facts alone should have
taken the case out of the purpose of the Fifteenth Amendment, which was
to prevent the white majority from excluding racial minorities from the
basic civil rights of participating in democratic government.
Indeed, in Rice, it was not necessary for the Court to confront the
15th Amendment issue because of the Court's decisions supporting the
constitutional authority of Congress to legislate on behalf of Native
peoples. Thus, regardless of the Court's tortured construction of the
Fifteenth Amendment, the Court might have distinguished the case as
being such that it is within Congress's power to delegate the ability to
protect Native Hawaiians' interests to the State of Hawaii.
The Supreme Court, however, refused to face the voluminous body
of federal Indian law that is applicable to the rights of Native Americans,
including Native Hawaiians. The absence of any Indian law analysis,
however, comports with the Rehnquist Court's lack of respect for case
precedent in Indian law cases. This case is also an example of the Court's
mission that has been characterized by Justice Scalia as determining "what
14
the current state of affairs ought to be."
Justices Stevens's and Ginsburg's dissent in Rice sets forth the
15
principles of federal Indian law that were applicable to the case. The
well-established principles begin with the trust relationship of the federal
government of the United States with indigenous peoples. This trust
relationship is established by treaties, agreements, court decisions,
congressional acts, and the United States' general dealing with indigenous
. peop1es. 16
sovereign
As part of that trust relationship, Congress has authority to enact
legislation on behalf of Native people. Congress has broad power in
Indian affairs, including the authority to identify indigenous groups falling
within the Indian affairs powers. This power is drawn from the Indian
17
Commerce Clause and Treaty Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
14

See David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New
Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1573, 1575 (1996).
15

Rice, supra note 3, at 527-39.
16

See generally Cherokee Nation, supra note 12; United States v. Kagama, 118
U.S. 375, 384-85 (1886).
17

The United States Constitution grants certain powers to the federal
government that have been held to authorize its role as a trustee to indigenous people.

The Supreme Court Declines

363

Legislation on behalf of any such group defined by Congress is not to be
viewed as discrimination based on race, as long as it is rationally tied to
18
the fulfillment of the United States' unique trust obligations.
Certainly, the decision in Rice was a severe blow to the selfdetermination efforts of Native Hawaiians, and its adverse ramifications
have been detailed here by the other panelists. Rice represents yet another
serious and continuing breach in a long history of dishonorable treatment
of Native peoples by the Supreme Court. The decision is particularly
harmful to Native Hawaiian interests because at least prior to the
Rehnquist Court, Indian tribes had a body of established law interpreting
and construing treaties and statutes passed by Congress. Unfortunately,
Native Hawaiians do not have such established case law. It is particularly
unfortunate that the Rice case reached the Court when the Supreme Court
is hostile to any interests that are not viewed by the Court as mainstream
values.
So, what does Rice mean for Indian tribes and individual Indians?
What potential impacts does it have in the field of federal Indian law? I
would like to explore those issues in the remainder of my presentation.
In Rice, the State of Hawaii argued that the Court has recognized
both the plenary power of Congress in affairs of Native Americans and the
special fiduciary trust relationship with descendants of the indigenous
19
peoples. Congress, thus, has a federal duty to provide for the protection
20
and care of Native peoples. The history of Native Hawaiians recited by
the majority revealed the grounds for recognizing the existence of a
federal trust relationship. Indeed, more than 150 laws passed by Congress,
in carrying out its duty to indigenous peoples, expressly include Native
Hawaiians as part of the class of Native Americans benefited.
Congress has identified Native Hawaiians as an indigenous group
falling within its Indian affairs powers. Unquestionably, like numerous
tribes in the continental United States, indigenous Hawaiians have both
historical and current bonds, as well as unrelinquished sovereignty and
territorial claims.
As pointed out by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, the trust
relationship with indigenous peoples has never depended on the origins of
Most important are the congressional power to regulate commerce, U.S. CONST. art. I, §
8, cl. 3, and the presidential power to make treaties, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
18

Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 554-55 (1974).
19

Rice, supra note 3, at 518.
20

Id.
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21

the people. The trust relationship has never depended on the allotment of
22
lands. The trust relationship has never depended on the existence of a
tribal self-government. And finally, the trust relationship has never
depended on the definition of "Indian" that Congress has chosen to
23
adopt.
Rather, Congress, in Indian affairs, has enacted legislation for the
special treatment of Native peoples, and the Court has concluded, "as long
as the special treatment can be tied rationally to the fulfillment of
Congress' unique obligation towards Indians, such legislative judgments
24
will not be disturbed." This standard was established in the Morton v.
25
Mancari case. Mancari is a case upholding the Bureau of Indian Affairs'
Indian preference in hiring and employment. Since 1974, this rationalbasis test has never been interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court to limit or
deny the trust relationship to indigenous peoples.
Declining to confront the rather simple logic of the trust
relationship and the application to Native Hawaiians, the majority of the
Court simply stated, "If Hawaii's restriction were to be sustained under
Mancari we would be required to accept some beginning premises not yet
26
established in our case law." The majority, not wanting to extend federal
Indian law decisions to include Native Hawaiians, further stated, "These
propositions would raise questions of considerable moment and
27
difficulty." The majority, however, does not elaborate on what questions
may be raised. It ended by saying, "We can stay far off that difficult
28
terrain, however." Considering the majority's reluctance to address the
Indian law issues, it is no surprise that Justices Stevens and Ginsburg
began their dissent by stating, "The Court's holding today rests largely on
21

Id. at 531.
22

Id.
23

Id.
24

Id. at 532 (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 554-55).
25

See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 535.
26

Rice, supra note 3, at 518.
27

Id.
28

Id. at 519.
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the repetition of glittering generalities that have little, if any, application to
29
the compelling history of the State of Hawaii."
Despite its reservations, the Court felt compelled to address the
Mancari case. In so doing, it found that Congress's trust-based power to
enact legislation for Native peoples is confined to dealing with tribes, not
with individuals, and no tribes or indigenous sovereign entity is found
among Native Hawaiians. More specifically, the Court stated the
classification in Mancari did not have a racial component, but rather a
political component that applied "only to members of 'federally
30
recognized' tribes." According to the Court, membership in a tribal
structure recognized by the United States is the acid test for the exercise of
Congressional power. In other words, the absence of a federally
recognized tribal government automatically makes legislation designed to
fulfill Congress's unique obligation to the Indian "race."
Rice is a prime example of the Court treading into the area of
congressional policymaking, and represents the Court's willingness to
restrict congressional power over Indian affairs. Such judicial activism
has been ongoing in the area of federal Indian law. Given the insulation of
the judiciary from the political process and the case-by-case nature of the
court's mission, it is especially problematic when the Court assumes that
its values are so pervasive and unexceptional that they should be extended
to fill gaps in the law, and then recasts Indian law-related policy rather
than deferring to Congress and the democratic process. Prior to Rice, the
Congress only, not the Court, determined the status or definition of
indigenous or Native Americans for purposes of legislating on behalf of
native peoples. Indeed, for thirty years, Congress has pursued a policy of
native self-determination, seeking wide public and Native American input
before it legislates.
We now have a Supreme Court decision that reads Mancari to state
that any legislation passed by Congress for the benefit of Indians is
confined to federally recognized Indian tribes and their members. The
Court has thus limited the reach of the trust-based power of Congress to
federally recognized tribes and their enrolled members. In short, the Court
has redefined the class of beneficiaries Congress is to protect.
What remains to be seen is what effect, if any, this decision will
have on Congress's plenary power in the area of Indian affairs. Certainly,
as a separate arm of the federal government, Congress has the power to
legislate for Native peoples. I believe that Congress will continue to
29

Id. at 527-28.

30

Id. at 520, quoting Mancari, 417 U.S. at 553, n.24.
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uphold its trust responsibility to Native Americans, including Native
Hawaiians. In more recent years, the balance between the Court and
Congress has switched. The Supreme Court seems bent on making its
own Indian policy to please Western interests, and Congress is now the
protector of Native interests.
Equally troubling about the Rice opinion is the idea that federal
programs or benefits through legislation can be only for federally
recognized Indian tribes or their members. A judicial narrowing of the
scope and purpose of federal power in Native affairs to reach only
federally recognized Indian tribes and their members would have
devastating results. If the trend narrowing the reach of federal policy that
is taking place in the judicial branch continues, non-federally recognized,
un-enrolled Indians could soon become non-Indians for all purposes under
Indian law.
This leads one to ask two primary questions. What does Rice and
this narrowing of trust protections mean for all the unrecognized or state
recognized tribal entities? And, what does this mean for individual
Indians who are not enrolled in their tribe?
There are more than 570 federally recognized and state-recognized
Indian tribes in the United States. State-recognized Indian tribes do not
have an established government-to-government relationship with the
United States. Instead, the United States may have terminated its
relationship with the tribe, and the state legislature then took action to
protect and provide for the benefit of those tribes. Many of those tribes do
participate in federal programs, however.
More than 200 Indian tribes are seeking federal acknowledgement
through the federal process. The federal recognition process is very time
consuming, costly, and political. There are no guarantees that the federal
process will result in an indigenous group being federally recognized.
Over the past 200 years, Congress has passed a tremendous
amount of legislation in the areas of health, educational, cultural and
religious protections that refer to Native Americans and include
individuals, not recognized or not enrolled in Indian tribes. Does the Rice
decision mean that any legislation that includes non-federally recognized
tribal entities must be found unconstitutional? Does it mean that any
legislation not meeting the newly construed Mancari test must fall by the
wayside?
More disturbing is the Rice decision's potential impact on
individual Indians who are not enrolled in a federally recognized Indian
tribe. Tribal membership in and of itself is a very contentious issue within
Indian communities. It is axiomatic that any sovereign has the inherent
authority to exercise its prerogative of determining for itself the criteria by
which its citizenry or membership is to be recognized by other sovereign
nations.
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Contrary to universal practices, the United States has often
preempted the rights of many indigenous nations to engage in this most
fundamental level of decision-making.
Beginning in the 1800s, the
federal policymakers imposed Indian identification standards of their own
design. These standards typically centered upon a notion of "blood
quantum," or degree of Indian blood. Such federal standards of "who is
an Indian" have created havoc with the American Indian sense of
nationhood and the individual sense of self over the past century.
In 1934, the Congress passed the Indian Reorganization Act
("IRA"), which was to replace the traditional Indian process of decisionmaking with a system approved and regulated by an elected tribal council.
Tribes were given boilerplate model constitutions by the Department of
Interior that contained membership requirements based on blood quantum.
Thus, tribes adopted or internalized the federal standards into their once
traditional decision-making regarding membership. Many tribes have set
their membership based upon one-half or one-quarter degree of Indian
blood of the particular tribe. They have determined that "Indianness" can
be measured by only the degree of Indian blood one possesses.
Today, the elected Tribal Councils and their enrollment offices
often make determinations about membership rather than relying upon the
tribal traditions of community standards as residing with the community,
knowledge of the tribal traditions, and service to the people. The blood
quantum requirements have resulted in reducing the numbers of tribal
enrollments. A person may be one-eighth Comanche, one-quarter Eastern
Shoshone, one-eighth Shoshone-Bannock and one-half Shoshone-Paiute,
and yet not meet the blood degree membership requirements of the
Comanche or Shoshone-Bannock Tribes. For example, a person may be
full-blooded Indian, reside on the Reservation, practice the traditions of
the tribe, but not be enrolled. That person is not a bona fide Indian in the
eyes of the tribal and federal government.
This tribal pattern of internalizing the federal standards has
resulted in much resentment among tribal members. These policies have
successfully kept Indians at odds with one another, even within their own
communities. There are "full bloods" who look down upon the "mixed
bloods," and mixed bloods who look down upon the "breeds."
Today, there exists a large population of Indians who are not
enrolled in federally recognized Indian tribes because of their decision to
not be part of the federal colonization, Indian-identification process
because of an expression of religious or cultural conviction or because
they do not meet the tribal criteria. Indeed, it is estimated that there are
1.7 million members of federally recognized Indian tribes. And, there are
8.7 million Americans who self-identify themselves as being Native
American.
Regardless, Justices Breyer and Souter concurred with the majority
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in Rice because they were concerned that the statute in question defined
31
the electorate too broadly. They were particularly concerned about the
32
Ironically, the statute was not that broad;
definition of "Hawaiian."
otherwise it would have included individuals such as Mr. Rice. In fact, the
first classification defined Native Hawaiians by the Congressionally fixed
membership definition. This one-half blood degree requirement is similar
to the early Indian allotment blood quantum statutes passed by the federal
government. Yet, Justices Breyer and Souter compare some Tribal
constitutional provisions with Hawaii's statute and declare, "it is not like
33
any actual membership classification created by any actual tribe." Thus,
the statute in question is too broad.
The cited tribal constitutions in the concurring opinion, however,
are the ones provided by the Department of Interior to tribes with blood
degrees. Moreover, there are many tribes who base their membership on
tribal residency, tribal traditions and knowledge, adopted members,
persons married to members, and service to the communities. And,
Congress has enacted similarly broad definitions of Indian or Native
34
These are broad definitions. Indeed, there is movement
American.
within Indian Country to do away with old IRA constitutional membership
criteria that have diminished tribal membership, and replace it with
traditional tribal standards. One wonders if some day these traditional
tribal standards will be viewed as too broad by the Court. According to
Justices Breyer and Souter, they probably would be.
Rice creates additional problems with the tribal membership issue
because it states that the trust relationship is with members of federally
recognized tribes. Does that mean that if one is Indian but not enrolled, he
or she cannot participate in the federal services, receive certain federal
protections to practice one's native religion, or receive federal funding for
31

Rice, supra note 3, at 526.
32

Id.
33

Id. at 527.
34

Federal law has broadly defined "Indians" or "Native Americans" in several
instances. See, e.g., Indian Health Care Improvement Act of 1976, 25 U.S.C. § 1603 (c)
(defining member of a tribe as including those terminated and those recognized in the
future; descendent in first or second degree of a member; and anyone "determined to be
an Indian under regulations promulgated by the Secretary"). Also, the Native American
Programs Act of 1974, creating the Administration for Native Americans, operates under
regulations with a very broad definition of Indian: "any individual who claims to be an
Indian and who is regarded as such by the Indian community in which he or she lives or
by the Indian community of which he or she claims to be a part." 45 C.F.R. § 1336.1
(1989).
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education?
A recent case out of the Tenth Circuit illustrates this issue with
regard to an Indian who is not enrolled but seeks to exercise his religious
rights. The case, Department of Interior v. Saenz, was most recently
argued en bane before the Tenth Circuit and is likely to be appealed by
either party to the Supreme Court.
The facts are as follows. Saenz is a descendent from the
Chiricahua tribe of Apache Indians. The Tribe was originally recognized
by the United States, but later in the 1880s after an outbreak of warfare,
the United States ceased relations. Mr. Saenz's ancestors fled to Mexico
and returned in the 1930s. The Chiricahua Indians are not currently
federally recognized. Mr. Saenz follows the traditions and beliefs of the
Chiricahua Apache, and as part of this belief system, he possesses eagle
feathers. In 1996, while New Mexico state police were executing a search
warrant, officers noticed the eagle feathers and contacted United States
Fish and Wildlife Service. The feathers were seized by the United States,
and Mr. Saenz sought to get the feathers back.
The federal regulations for distribution of eagle feathers, amended
in 1999, state that an applicant must be a member of a federally
recognized Indian tribe. Of course, Mr. Saenz does not meet that
requirement. The United States argued that the regulations are clear and
they do not need to return the feathers to Mr. Saenz. The government
maintained that it has a trust responsibility to federally recognized
members and to protect the conservation of eagle feathers. Further, it
argued that opening the process to all Native Americans, regardless of
membership in a federally recognized tribe, would result in a permit
system that relied on an impermissible racial classification. Mr. Saenz
argued that the definition is too limiting; the permit process should be
open to all Native Americans regardless of their political status. Also, the
First Amendment, protecting an individual's free exercise rights,
guaranteed him the right to such feathers to practice his religion.
The Tenth Circuit held for Mr. Saenz. The Court of Appeals found
that the exercise of one's First Amendment free exercise rights should not
be conditioned on his political status-whether or not he is a member of a
federally recognized tribe. This decision certainly does not comport with
the Rice decision. According to Rice, Congress only legislates for and on
behalf of federally recognized Indian tribes, and any person not enrolled in
such a tribe has no protections from the United States. We will have to
wait to see whether the Supreme Court chooses to review this case and
apply its Rice precedent.
In conclusion, the Rice decision goes well beyond Hawaii and its
impact on Native Hawaiians. Indian tribes and Native Hawaiians share
similar histories and a similar relationship with the United States. Until
Rice, it had long been assumed that when Congress passed acts for Native
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Americans, including Indian tribes, individual Indians, and Native
Hawaiians, these acts were tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress's
unique obligation toward Native peoples and would not be disturbed by
the judiciary. This assumption is because of the extensive legislative
process that allows for public comments and opposition from all interested
parties. The democratic process is the foundation of any enacted
congressional bill.
But, as we now know, the maJonty of the Rehnquist Court is
advancing a color-blind agenda. Thus, following Rice, it appears that
there may be a narrowing of the trust relationship and there may be extra
judicial scrutiny employed when reviewing statutes enacted for native
peoples of the United States. Moreover, the Court, perhaps in dictum only,
declares that any such legislation must be for only federally recognized
Indian tribes and members of those tribes.
Fortunately, the new judicial limitations in Rice represent a judicial
trend only. They have not been paralleled by any changes in congressional
or executive policy concerning Native affairs. The recent trend, however,
is a threat to Native peoples, and should not be taken lightly. This trend
runs counter to the proclaimed federal policy of self-determination and
federal Indian law principles.
As Indian tribes have shown, the Court's decisions must be
confronted and not avoided. Native Hawaiians must arise above the Rice
decision and seek redress in either Congress or the international arena.
The international arena is increasingly a basis for affirming the rights of
indigenous peoples upon moral and ethical foundations.
As always, I wish the Native people of Hawaii the best in their
ongoing struggle to gain full self-determination. This concludes my
presentation. I thank you for giving me this opportunity to express my
views to you.

